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Political Travel Constraint: The Role of Chinese Popular Nationalism 
Abstract 
This study conceptualized a new type of political travel constraint by examining the role that 
popular nationalism has on Chinese outbound travel. Using a case study approach based on 
the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Incident between China and Japan, the study demonstrates 
how Chinese popular nationalism has the potential to shape the geopolitical environment of 
all outbound Chinese tourism. The study proposes a new model that can be used to illustrate 
how popular nationalism may affect bilateral tourism in other settings.  Findings of this 
study offer important insights for both scholars and practitioners in understanding the impact 
of Chinese popular nationalism on bilateral tourist flows. 
 
Keywords: Popular nationalism, travel constraint, Chinese outbound tourists, Japan, tourist 
flow 
Introduction 
Researchers have identified a number of factors that drive tourists’ decision making and 
behaviors. One group of researchers has focused on the role of motives (Crompton, 1979; 
Iso-Aloha, 1982; Pearce & Lee, 2005). Other studies have focused on travel constraints, 
many of which have adopted the leisure constraint model first advanced by Crawford and 
Godbey (1987) who proposed the model in an attempt to address the problem of leisure 
barriers by examining interactions between the person and their social and physical 
environment.   Recent applications of the leisure constraint model in a tourism context have 





(or environmental) (Lee, Agarwal, & Kim, 2012; Nyaupane & Andereck, 2008; Zhang, 
Zhang, Cheng, Lu, & Shi, 2012). Yet there are limitations to the application of the leisure 
constraint model when used in a travel context because constraints on travel tend to be 
viewed within a Western paradigm that as Dong & Chick (2012, p.417) observed centers on 
‘Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic’ society’. This may ignore 
non-Western political and cultural dimensions. As a consequence, research on the linkage 
between political ideology and its influence on tourist decisions and behaviors is seldom 
reported in the literature, despite evidence of the potential for political tensions to affect 
travel demand (Kim & Prideaux, 2012). The lack of research on political travel constraints 
has limited our understanding of the reasons why tourists avoid travelling to some countries 
and in particular how constraints of this type may affect tourist decision making at different 
points in time such as during or after a crisis event. 
 
Evidence from China indicates that major international political disruptions affecting 
bilateral relations often have a flow-on effect on Chinese consumers and their travel 
behaviors.  In a recent example, a 2014 South China Sea dispute with the Philippines 
resulted in a 50% declined in travel to the Philippines between September 2014 and April 
2015 (Philippines Department of Tourism, 2015). In a similar manner, the 2012 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Incident between China and Japan resulted in a fall of nearly 40% of 
Chinese visitors to Japan (Japan National Tourism Organization, 2014) (Table 1) after the 
incident. Given the size of China’s outbound market, it is important to note that current 
studies on Chinese outbound tourists are particularly positive about its rapid and largely 
uninterrupted growth and failed to recognize the complicated socio-cultural and political 
realities of tourist flows. As such, this study challenges the normative economic excitement 
of the uninterrupted growing nature of outbound Chinese tourists and offers a different 





China’s outbound tourism from a grassroots level and uncovers Chinese popular nationalism 
as a political travel constraint for Chinese tourists that enriches the existing studies on 
constraints of Chinese outbound travel (Li, Zhang, Mao, & Deng, 2011; Sparks & Pan, 2009; 
Zhou, King, & Turner, 1998) by introducing political factors as a specific travel constraint.  
From a boarder theoretical lens on studies concerning tourist flows, this study moves 
beyond the predominant normative economic models based on economic variables such as 
relative price, income or exchange rate in understanding tourist flows. It has acknowledged 
the political realities between two formerly hostile nations to identify underlying factors that 
may affect tourist flows. More importantly, as suggested by Timothy and Kim (2015), tourist 
flows may be volatile and fluctuate based on fluid variables that changes from time to time. 
Chinese popular nationalism stems in part from Chinese consumers’ increasing knowledge 
about the West, their perceptions of unfair treatment by Western countries in the past, and 
more recently national pride in China’s emergence as a global economic power (Zhao, 2004). 
Given the growing size of Chinese outbound market as a percentage of global tourist flows 
and the potential for deterioration in political relations to adversely affect tourist flows, an 
understanding of the implications of Chinese popular nationalism is becoming more 
important and this helps us re-evaluate the ways Chinese outbound tourism has been 
understood (Cheng & Wong, 2014). 
This study aims to examine how popular nationalism has become an important 
political travel constraint in a Chinese context. This study draws upon the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Incident to investigate the role that popular nationalism may have on Chinese outbound 
tourists’ preferences and behaviors. The paper also proposes a descriptive model to illustrate 
the impact of Chinese popular nationalism on Chinese outbound tourists. The purpose of the 
model (Figure 1) is to illustrate the various elements that may collectively effect bilateral 





travel constraints and Chinese popular nationalism, and the background of the island dispute 
incident between Japan and China. A discussion of the research approaches employed in this 
study follows. Findings of this study are then presented and discussed, and the paper 
concludes with both theoretical and practical implications that go beyond this study.   
Literature Review 
The theoretical foundation of this study rests on several research streams pertaining to tourist 
decision-making and destination choice, travel constraints, and nationalism. The theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical evidence of these research areas help develop the research 
model presented in Figure 1. In particular, this study focuses on political travel constraints as 
a manifestation of popular nationalism (Gries, 2006; Huges, 2006; Zhao, 2005). The 
destination choice and decision making theories (Crompton, 1992; Um & Crompton, 1990; 
Woodside & Lysonski, 1989) also shape the conceptualization of this research in respect to 
how tourists elect to avoid and reject visiting a specific destination during a certain point in 





The body of the literature on tourist decision making often points to the importance of 
destination choice in shaping tourist final travel decision. The work of Crompton and 
colleague (Crompton, 1992; Um & Crompton, 1990) assert that travel decision making has 
three primary stages which involve a sequence of choice sets. In the first stage, the tourist 
evokes an awareness set of destinations which he or she would then select for later 





tourist finally reaches a decision on his/her next trip in the final stage of the process. Both 
external stimuli (e.g., the media, reference groups, and social pressures) and internal stimuli 
(e.g., personal characteristics, motives, values, and attitudes) may exercise extensive 
influence on the formation of destination choice sets during this process (Um & Crompton, 
1990; Woodside & Lysonski, 1989; Woodside, Macdonald, & Burford, 2004). For example, 
intrinsic motives such as a desire to seek novelty and relaxation may affect a tourist to 
consider an array of Asian and Polynesian destinations. Yet, the recent political turmoils and 
instability in the Middle East and some Asian regions (e.g., Thailand and Hong Kong) 
reported by the media and commonly discussed in the community may impose social 
pressure in the selection process, resulting in a limited number of places in Asia and 
Polynesian islands such as Singapore and Hawaii where political stability can be taken for 
granted.   
The preceding discussion  points to another important aspect in the consideration 
process: situational constraints (Um & Crompton, 1990; Woodside & Lysonski, 1989) such 
as the media and reference groups. Much of the destination choice and travel constraint 
literature focuses on tourist-related situational factors such as time, cost, and personal 
incidents, and largely ignored the role of political incidents in inhibiting tourist travel 
decisions (Nyaupane & Andereck, 2008). However, recent empirical evidence indicates that 
the political situation of potential destinations may also affect tourist decision making (Karl, 
Reintinger, & Schmude, 2015). Building on this view, this research moves beyond previous 
research to include consideration of political factors such as nationalism in the process of 







Travel constraints    
 
The standard discourse in the extant tourism literature describes travel constraints as factors 
that inhibit people’s desire to travel; inhibits their ability to begin, maintain or increase their 
frequency of travel; and the subsequent negative effects this causes on the quality of travel 
(Cho, Bonn, & Brymer, 2014; Hung & Petrick, 2010). The terms “risks”, “barriers” and 
“inhibitors” are sometimes interchangeable with travel constraints, as they have similar 
meanings. Travel constraint studies to date have been based primarily on the leisure 
constraint model (Crawford & Godbey, 1987; Hubbard & Mannell, 2001). The three 
dimensions of leisure constraints (intrapersonal, interpersonal and structural) suggested by 
Crawford and Godbey (1987) have had a significant impact on the understanding of factors 
that constrain travel activities. Intrapersonal constraints describe individual psychological 
states (such as anxiety, stress and depression) which are subject to change over a short time 
period and may lead to lower participation. Interpersonal constraints refer to the 
unavailability of other people, which usually occurs when people require at least one partner 
or they have a strong preference for a co-participant to participate in activities of interests. 
These types of constraints have a tendency to change across people’s life stages and largely 
depend on family size and activity types. The structural constraints represent lack of money, 
opportunity, unavailability of time, inconvenient accessibility and inadequate information. 
These three type of constrains are argued to occur in a hierarchical manner. Crawford, 
Jackson, and Godbey (1991) argue that to maintain an individuals’ impetus, they need to 
negotiate through “an alignment of multiple factors, arranged sequentially, that could be 
overcome, through these systematic level” (p.314). Indeed, evidence shows that tourist’s final 
travel decision is a successful negotiation of most perceived or real constraints rather than 
absence of constraints (Chen, Chen, & Okumus, 2013). If tourists’ motivation traveling to a 





Andereck, 2008), such as costs. For example, Fendt and Wilson (2012) argued that 
individuals can negotiate their travel constraints, such as social-cultural and practical 
constraints for women participating in surfing tourism, if they maintain a positive attitude, 
have better preparation, and are passionate about their travel activities.  
While the leisure constraint model has been widely accepted and tested a number of 
times (He, Li, Harrill, & Cardon, 2014; Lai, Li, & Harrill, 2013), recent studies have 
identified a new range of travel constraints.   Dong and Chick (2012), for example, argue 
that constraints constitute a cultural domain including items or ideas that members of a 
particular social group understand and regard as important and as a result affect attitudes 
towards travel.  Chen et al. (2013) identified a new constraint dimension termed as 
‘unfamiliar cultural constraints’ during a study of Taiwanese youth travellers’ travel 
constraints to Brunei. Other researchers have also identified new sub dimensions under each 
specific constraint dimension. For example, Nyaupane and Andereck’s (2008) study in 
Arizona found that the structural constraint dimension could be expanded to include the 
sub-dimensions of “place attributes”, “cost” and “lack of time”. Finally, in a study of Chinese 
outbound tourists’ perceived constraints to visiting the United States, Lai et al. (2013) found 
that the “interpersonal” constraints dimension did not apply but rather two distinct 
sub-dimensional constraints (“lacking security” and “English language barriers”) were 
important. Collectively, these findings suggest that the travel constrain model may not be 
universal and that tourists’ cultural and political context may be an important indicator of 
attitudes to travel.  
In general, the literature has tended to focus on political instability within tourist 
destinations (e.g. War) (Alvarez & Campo, 2014) and government policy towards  tourist 
flows (Prideaux, 2005), with less attention paid to tourist behaviour between previously 





still lack a detailed understanding of how political issues act as a travel constraint, and in the 
case of China, the role of Chinese popular nationalism.  
 
Chinese Popular Nationalism 
 
The concept of nationalism is subject to various theoretical interpretations and potentially 
negative connotations (Smith, 2001). At one end of the spectrum Blank & Schmidt (2003, p. 
293) state that ‘Nationalism supports the nation in areas where there are authoritarian 
structures between the nation and its citizens, or where such structures are aspired to’. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the social psychological view of nationalism advocated by 
Kedourie (1993) suggests that nationalism is ‘very much a matter of one’s self-view, of one’s 
estimation of oneself and one’s place in the world’ (p.141).  For the purposes of this 
research and in the spirit of Kedourie (1993) approach, nationalism is defined broadly as the 
commitment to safeguard one’s national identity. This approach also draws on Gries’ (2006) 
view of nationalism which is understood as that aspect of an individual’s self-concept that as 
the author notes, ‘derives from his or her perceived membership in a national group’ (p.490). 
It is important to note that nationalism is different from patriotism, which refers to 
an emotional attachment to a nation which an individual recognizes as their homeland and is 
usually coupled with national feeling or national pride (Kelman, 1997). Patriotism is not 
necessarily directed toward a nation state, whereas nationalism emphases the relationship of 
the individual to state in maintaining the state’s independence, integrity and effective 
functioning (Kelman, 1997).  
In contemporary China, two types of nationalism can be identified:  “Chinese State 
Nationalism” and “Popular Nationalism” (Gries, 2006; Huges, 2006; Zhao, 2005). These are 





induced by the Chinese government. The latter is bottom up, and initiated by the Chinese 
people. Due to the anti-foreign tenor of Chinese popular nationalism, it appears to be largely 
the same as state nationalism and as such, many Western scholars have treated popular 
nationalists as puppets under the control of the Communist Party (Gries, 2006). However, 
popular nationalism has gradually strengthened its influence vis-à-vis state nationalism in 
recent years due to Chinese consumers’ increasing knowledge about the West and their 
perceptions of unfair treatment of China by Western countries in the past, and more recently 
China’s emergence as a global economic power beginning in the late 1990s (Zhao, 2004). 
Outbursts of popular nationalism are easily provoked by international events that seemingly 
insult China, especially by countries that have been hostile to China in the past. The 
accumulation of impacts does not come from the “accretion of evidence” but rather from its 
“symbolic value” (Birkland, 1997). That is, the interpretation of China’s historical memory 
has created a framework against which the incident is viewed and this constantly modifies 
Chinese nationalist sentiments (Li, 2009). In respect to the political relationship between 
China and Japan, anti-Japan sentiments are particularly strong amongst the Chinese public 
because of both nations’ contested history and contemporary political conflicts. One outcome 
of anti-Japanese sentiment has been massive anti-Japanese demonstrations across China 
(Huges, 2006). 
Existing research directed towards building an understanding of Chinese popular 
nationalism has centered largely on its manifestation in conventional demonstrations against 
foreign products (Gao, 2012; Ishii, 2013) and increasing demands for political participation 
(Huges, 2006; Tang & Darr, 2012). The 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute was widely 
reported in the Chinese media on the rapid fall in Chinese outbound travel to Japan 
highlighting for the first time the role of popular nationalism in travel decision making.  





this research also illustrates the need for a deeper understanding of the theoretical linkage 
between political sciences and tourism (Matthews & Richter, 1991) beyond the current 
approaches that mainly focus on policy analysis when analyzing international relationship on 
tourist flow (Timothy & Kim, 2015).   
Research context 
Japan and China have a long record of political conflicts and uneasy diplomatic relations 
dating back to the nineteenth century during the Qing Dynasty. Japan’s seizing of Russia’s 
Chinese territories after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 and further aggression in 
Manchuria in 1931 which later escalated into a full scale invasion and the deaths of millions 
of Chinese civilians and military personnel, has shaped Chinese views of Japan (Cui, 2012; 
Li, 2009). Recent incidents, such as the Japanese Prime Minister’s contentious visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine where a large number of executed World War Two Japanese war criminals 
are buried, and the Japanese government’s constant reconstruction of history textbooks, has 
intensified political conflicts between the two countries (Tian & Pasadeos, 2012). 
Collectively, this past uneven history has influenced Chinese views on contemporary political 
relations with Japan. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute erupted after the Japanese government publicly 
expressed its intention to purchase these disputed islands from a private Japanese owner to 
diffuse its “territorial dispute” with China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China, 2012).  In September 2012, after direct but non-lethal confrontation 
between Chinese and Japanese coast guard and fishing vessels, anti-Japan sentiments grew 
rapidly and triggered the largest anti-Japanese protests across dozens of mainland cities since 
China and Japan normalised diplomatic relations in 1972 (Li & He, 2012; Spegele & 





boycotting Japanese goods and services. Some protests turned violent with attacks on 
Japanese made cars, sacking of Japanese restaurants and demonstrators throwing rocks and 
eggs at the Japanese embassy (South China Morning Post, 2012). From the perspective of the 
broader literature, the action taken against Japan, travel to Japan and Japanese made products 
is a form of brand and product rejection, and even boycott (Lee, Motion, & Conroy, 2009; 
Yuksel & Mryteza, 2009), with Japan being perceived as the overarching brand that actions 
such as the boycott were aimed at.  In this sense, the anti-consumption campaigns elevated 
personal travel decisions from a protest based on brands and products to a social phenomenon 
involving nationalism derived views on the propriety of travel. 
Japan has been a long-time favourite holiday destination for Chinese tourists and around 
20 percent of all international visitors to Japan are Chinese outbound tourists (Japan National 
Tourism Organization, 2014). As Table 1 highlights, there was a sharp decline in Chinese 
travel to Japan during the period of the dispute despite the fact that no travel warning was 
issued by the Chinese government, the Japanese Yen was depreciating against the Chinese 
RMB (Japan National Tourism Organization, 2014) and travel to other destinations was 
increasing (Park & Han, 2012).  In Japan, many inbound operators reported difficulties due 
to the decrease in the number of arrivals from Chinese visitors (Chiu, 2013). For this reason, 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute offers a timely case study on the manifestation of 











Table 1: Monthly flow of Mainland Chinese tourists traveling to Japan in 2011 and 2012 
 Number of visitors Changes (%) compared 
to 2011 monthly 
 2011 2012  
January 99,131 136,665 37.9 
February 105,362 81,966 -22.2 
March 62,450 129,302 107.0 
April 76,164 148,793 95.4 
May 58,603 112,152 91.4 
June 61,419 125,983 105.1 
July 86,963, 204,270 134.9 
August 102,640 190,254 85.4 
September 112,493 121,673 8.2 
October 106,174 69,713 -34.3 
November  92,154 51,993 -43.6 
December 79,688 52,336 -34.3 





1,425,100 (18%)  
Total for Foreign 








Based on the previous discussion we postulate that Chinese popular nationalism has emerged 
as a new form of political travel constraint that has the potential to negatively influence 
Chinese tourists' attitudes and travel intentions towards Japan.  To gain insights into how 





inductive approach was adopted using a qualitative interpretative paradigm, as existing 
studies in travel constraints are mostly based on quantitative approach and have failed to 
provide a detailed understanding of the constraints, negotiation strategies, and contexts in 
which the dynamics of constraint-negotiation process occurs (Mannell, Iwasaki, & Jackson, 
2005). Data was collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews. The rationale for 
choosing an interpretivist approach was to enable participants’ voices to be heard, to explore 
‘embedded meaning’ and to discover reasons for observed behaviour (Huberman, 2003).  
The respondents were selected based on purposeful sampling of Shanghai residents 
who delayed or abandoned their trips to Japan. Selection of this group enabled the researchers 
to identify a range of travel attitudes and further behavioral changes that had not been 
previously identified in the literature. The lead researcher recruited 25 volunteers with an 
almost equal number of males and females ranging in age from 23 to 56 years from one of the 
largest outbound Chinese travel agencies in Shanghai with the assistance of one of the 
company managers. In all eight persons declined to participate. Two semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with each informant in a place of the informants’ choices. The 
rationale for choosing Shanghai as the research context were twofold: 1) despite Shanghai 
being attacked by Japan in World War II, Japan has long been ranked as the most popular 
travel destination for Shanghai residents; 2) tourists from Shanghai account for a large 
proportion of Chinese visitors to Japan (World Travel Online, 2012) but the number of 
visitors to Japan dropped significantly during the period of the dispute (Japan National 
Tourism Organization, 2014).  
The lead researcher is a native Mainland Chinese citizen which aids deeper and richer 
insights into the respondents’ views because of the sensitive nature and potential 





place during the most severe period of diplomatic tensions. The interview questions focus on 
respondents’ decisions to delay or cancel their trip to Japan. The second interview with the 
same informants was conducted three months later, when Chinese outbound tourism to Japan 
had resumed (Japan National Tourism Organization, 2014).  In the second interview 
informants were asked about their future intention to visit Japan and the reasons for doing so. 
The rationale of this approach was to understand the incident’s impacts on Chinese tourists’ 
views over the duration of the tension.  
During the interview, the lead author introduced himself to each informant, outlined 
the purpose of this research and gained written consent to proceed with the interview 
questions.  Pseudonym names were used to maintain the anonymity of participants. Records 
of the interviews identified participants only by their pseudonyms. Additionally, the 
researcher showed genuine respect and appeared to represent no threat to the informants, 
which helped in gaining their trust. Because of the potentially sensitive nature of the topic, 
the researcher first asked general questions about respondent’s views on the current 
phenomena, and when the informants felt relaxed, asked more specific questions regarding 
their travel. Both rounds interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour on average. The 
interviews were not tape-recorded, as a number of informants explicitly expressed their 
anxiety of being taped because of the sensitive nature of this study. Overall, the interviews 
generated 102 pages of notes. 
In both rounds of interviews, interviewing continued until theoretical saturation was 
reached. That is, the data no longer supported the existence of new conceptual categories or 
category properties (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). As Burrell and Morgan (1979) have noted, 
meanings are socially constructed while knowledge is negotiated within cultural settings and 





with the informants while he immersed himself in the social setting thereby enabling the 
researcher to investigate aspects of respondents’ views that reveal aspects of the fundamental 
meaning that underlies their individual and collective social understandings (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). The researchers were able to build an understanding of contemporary 
Chinese culture and associated political views and use this as a platform to explain the 
underlying social phenomenon and associated themes. A standard thematic analysis was 
undertaken to analyze transcripts. We began the coding process by developing in-vivo codes 
in Chinese, and similar codes were then organized into higher-level themes. The 
interpretation of the findings was then expanded and refined. The themes were then translated 
into English. The quotes in the study are illustrative and representative examples that were 
common across the data set. The researchers found that themes emerging from the dataset 
were related to theories or concepts of, for example, social identity theory (Gries, 2006) and 
imagined communities (Anderson, 1983). The following discussion is supported by direct 
quotes, which reflect the voice of participants and supports findings (Creswell, 2007; Krueger 
& Casey, 2009). Following Kruger & Casey’s (2009) advice, three quotes for each theme 
category was adopted to build a comprehensive understanding of the views of respondents. 
While informants were advised that their identities would remain anonymous, some 
responses may have been influenced by the sensitive nature of the study. It was not possible 
to estimate the degree to which this may have occurred.  It is also important to note that 
some of the stories may have been “well-rehearsed” to provide a “proper socially acceptable 
answer”. Occasionally, as an insider, the lead researcher felt emotionally attached to the way 
in which informants expressed their feelings. As such, the stories may have been influenced 
by the occasional questions asked by the researcher when the researcher sensed a hesitant 
attitude or conflicting statements from the informants. However, this does not make these 





through the voices of the informants (Gudmundsdottir, 2006). Although there may be a 
degree of bias, the process allows the study to achieve a richness and depth that a non-native 
Mainland researcher may not be able to achieve as Denzin and Lincoln (2003) suggested. 
Results 
Political incident as a catalyst in triggering Chinese popular nationalism 
It became apparent during the study that Chinese popular nationalism does influence Chinese 
outbound tourism. Eighteen of the 25 informants explicitly commented that they could be 
described as people who exhibited nationalist sentiments towards China and any actions 
against their group would be considered as improper. As one informant explained, “I 
understand what is important, and I am Chinese. So I do not want to stand on the wrong side, 
and be seen as someone who does not love my country?” Another informant stated “I am 
afraid if I go there (Japan), then someone will take a picture of me and state that I don’t like 
my country.” (Peter, M, 28). Another 42 year old informant added that “I do not want to say I 
am a nationalist. But travelling at this particular moment does not seem a wise choice both 
for my personal interests and my social life” (Wendy, F). This response reflects the view 
(Zhao, 2000) that many Chinese people recognise the importance of their national identity at 
a whole of society level and then they relate this to themselves at an individual level. On this 
basis, findings of this study shows that rising Chinese popular nationalism complicates the 
political situation in the grassroots community of China and explains why the Chinese public 
have a propensity to refrain from travelling to a tourism destination during periods of tension 
(e.g. Japan). For this reason it is apparent that popular nationalism can have a serious effect 
on tourism destinations that are in dispute with China. 
Most informants reported that the most frequent information they heard about the 





nationalistic tone that focused on the view that “Japan is still against us.”  As one informant 
stated, “the regular political movements of the Japanese government did not make me feel 
that they acknowledge the past” (Tom, 31, M). Another informant further explained, 
“although I do not care about politics, I am still Chinese. I have grown up with the issues 
concerning Japan and China. When this incident happened, all the things happened before 
just popped into mind” (Silvia, 27, F). This view was reinforces by another informant who 
stated “well, I believe Japanese people are nice. But when you hear bad sides of it [Japan] 
many times, it just makes you feel bad about Japan.” (Jennifer, 27, F). These messages 
convey a nationalist sentiment, which encourages the Chinese public to view Japan as a 
potential enemy. This situation is amplified by the Chinese media and nationalism activists 
who are keen to publicize any mishap related to Japan because it rouses Chinese nationalist 
sentiments and reaches a larger audience (Wang, 2006). It regularly reminds Chinese of 
China’s uneasy history with Japan and is interpreted as a sign that the Japanese government 
appears to be trying to suppress China. Moreover, it helps to unite the nation and strengthens 
the Chinese public’s collective power against Japan. The Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute 
exemplifies how incidents in China’s political relations with other countries can easily 
provoke a strong backlash against a particular tourism destination. 
Short term impact 
When the nation’s interest is perceived to be at stake or is threatened by foreigners, 
the Chinese public has a significant propensity to react negatively. In this case action was on 
a personal level through either cancellation or delay of travel. During the period of tension 
many Chinese also refrained from purchasing Japanese consumer goods as another form of 
protest. This practice was perceived by informants to be effective due to China’s economic 
power. In this case, Japanese nationalists visiting the Diaoyu/Senkaku island were regarded 





stake, and the purpose of the collective response was to teach the Japanese government a 
lesson that China cannot be bullied. As one of the informants explicitly stated “I understand a 
lot of us do this as perhaps a way to let them [Japanese government] understand China is not 
the China of 20 years ago, and we are now a country with great economic power” (Tony, 41, 
M). This view was reiterated by Jason (23, M) who explained, “I like Japanese brands and 
traveling to Japan, but the thing is that they [Japan] should understand only peace with China 
contributes to the future of Japan. Clearly, we are the second strongest economy in the 
world.” Another informant added “I was feeling so unconformable when I ate in a Japanese 
restaurant the other day. Why should I make economical contributions to our unfriendly 
friend to help them build up their economy against us?” (Jennifer, 27, F). This finding is in 
line with previous studies that the reactive nature of Chinese popular nationalism not only 
exists in the political space but also is expressed as anti-foreign sentiments in economic 
arenas (Huges, 2006), such as abandoning visits to Japan. 
Significantly, a number of the informants also mentioned that their companies advised 
them to refrain from travelling to Japan during the island dispute. As one of the informants 
stated “my company sent out an email to every staff saying, please do not associate yourself 
with this political incident” (Andrew, 29, M). Another informant pointed out “the thing is that  
travel agencies seldom refund your trip. But this time, they refunded my booking fee. You 
know, you could not separate this with the government” (Simone, 35, F). Thirty-five year old 
Cameron explained, “ we have planned to travel to Japan for our company’s annual incentive 
travel. Then suddenly, the management told everyone that travel agencies are concerned with 
our safety and our trip needs to be delayed. Well, really?” and he smiled (M). These 
companies were mostly state-owned enterprises. This incident shows that the issue goes 
beyond the grassroots level. Thus, Chinese popular nationalism is also manifested in a 





their current stand towards previously hostile countries, such as the message of 
discouragement from the state owned enterprise reported above. 
Long term impact 
However, their negative travel intentions towards Japan had changed significantly 
when the lead researcher interviewed the informants three months later, by which time 
tensions had subsided. Out of 25 informants, sixteen had resumed their travel plans to Japan 
in early 2013 and the other nine also expressed a desire to travel to Japan at a later stage. 
“Actually, I am planning to visit Japan during Chinese New Year. You know, the incident is 
not as severe as before. Also, not many people care about it now” (Simone, 35, F). Jennifer 
(27, F) also pointed out “you know many travel agencies have already started their tours to 
Japan. So I might join them as well.” Another informant expressed his desire to Japan by 
saying that “my colleagues went there two weeks ago and they told me it [their trip in Japan] 
was fantastic. No safety issue there. Apparently, there is no issue traveling to Japan in my 
company. So why should I not go there?” (Christine, F, 38). Though there are a number of 
reasons why they resumed their travel plans, time appears to be a significant variable in 
respect to the impact of popular nationalism. That is, its direct impact lasted only for a short 
period but was clearly effective in constraining Chinese tourists’ outbound travel.  However, 
the informants also admitted that if the same political incident reoccurred, they would 
probably cancel their travel plans to Japan. This indicates that although the apparent impact is 
time dependent it can easily rebound, because of real or perceived damage to China’s 
national identity. As Gao (2012, p. 187) observed, contentious actions by the Japanese 
government has helped ‘unite otherwise disconnected individual consumers into emotionally 






Three main themes emerged from the research and are outlined in Table 2. Each theme 
provides insights into the views and actions of the participants. These themes are: 
1.  A political incident that acts as a catalyst for growth of popular nationalism. The 
incident demonstrated the ability of a political dispute such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands to influence Chinese outbound travel through the effect it had on Chinese 
nationalism. Given other recent disputes with neighbouring countries such as Vietnam 
this aspect of Chinese nationalism can be regarded as a general condition of Chinese 
life, not just a factor that is restricted to Japan. This observation is important and 
parallels recent findings by Prideaux and Tse (2015).  
2. The grassroots nature of travel constraints. The grassroots nature of popular Chinese 
nationalism can be directed upward to affect national policy. This form of nationalism 
is a strong driver in individual decision making as to which destinations are seen as 
acceptable to visit by colleagues and friends. 
3. The role of state travel constraints. Decisions by the state to direct personal travel 
decisions may be both bottom-up and top-down. In the case of bottom-up, the state is 
able to influence the decision making of individuals through state owned media and 
companies. In turn, popular opinions may sometimes influence policy based on how 
the collective voice of the nation responds to various incidents. This may be aided by 
the ability of the state to influence the media through its ownership of the media. 
Top-down decisions may also be influenced by foreign and in some cases domestic 
policy considerations and usually in the form of state direction over tourists’ 
decisions. 








Political incident as a 
catalyst for the 
break- out of popular 
nationalism 
influencing Chinese 
tourist from group 




I have cancelled my travel plan to Japan and will not visit Japan at least 
these two months. At the moment, seemingly, everyone is against Japan. 
The media brings up the historical issues with Japan, such as the invasion 
in second war… It is kinda of making everyone’s patriotic sentiments 
stronger…Well, I do not care about politics but this (patriotic sentiments) 
makes me a bit uncomfortable, as I am still Chinese. At a personal level, I 
feel like that if I go there, my colleague and friends will think I am kinda of 
against the Chinese public and feel like I am traitor (卖国贼). To me, I am 
afraid if I go there, then someone will take a picture of me and state that 




I do think it is the accumulating national sentiments made me think twice 
and delayed my travel plan…Well, I am still considering it but the thing is 
that every time it (the political incident) happens, I guess we will have no 
choices. This kind of influence is quite time dependent… Because looking 
at the current situation now, I feel like every time this happens, it will 
stimulate a group of nationalists and it reminds me of all the things before. 
The incident will go away soon, but when it happens, it (the nationalist 
sentiments) comes up again. For me, personally, I do not hate Japan. I mean 
it is a beautiful tourist destination but I just feel a bit weird if I go there at 




Personally, I might go there next year when the situation becomes less 
severe. The other day, our company (managers) sent out an email to every 
staff saying; please do not associate yourself with this political incident. I 
mean…. my company did this because my boss does not want our company 
to be in the nationalism spotlight. It will not be good for our reputation. I 
mean thinking of this, people’s nationalism sentiments are so high at this 
moment, and the government I think will somehow listen to the voices. 
Actually, I was so amazed for this incident that how firmly the government 
stands out. This made me think of the case of the Philippines. You know 








To illustrate the forces of nationalism described earlier, an explanatory model (Figure 1) was 
developed to show the various relationships involved. This approach to model building is 
based on Getz’s (1986) typology of models that proposed two classes of tourism models: a 
descriptive or theoretical class of model that can be used to reduce a wide range of potential 
variables into a set of manageable relationships able to be used to describe and explain 
various aspects of the tourism system, and an operational class of models able to be used for 
planning purposes. The model proposed in Figure 1 falls into Getz’s first class of model 
types. From a theoretical perspective, the model is underpinned by several research streams 
pertaining to tourist decision-making and destination choice (Crompton, 1992; Um & 
Crompton, 1990; Woodside & Lysonski, 1989), travel constraints (Nyaupane & Andereck, 
2008; Pennington-Gray & Kerstetter, 2002), and nationalism (Gries, 2006; Huges, 2006; 
Zhao, 2005) as detailed above.  
The right side of Figure 1 illustrates in the causes of popular nationalism. Chinese 
popular nationalism, as a grassroots political ideology (Gries, 2006), is usually triggered by a 
catalyst such as a political incident (the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute for example). 
Although issues related to domestic and international politics is seldom mentioned in the 
travel literature, this factor plays a role in influencing the tourists’ initial consideration set of 
destination choice and manifests as a critical source of travel constraint. Yet, the duality of 
this factor goes beyond existing knowledge and understanding from travel constraint and 
destination choice theories which offer connation to individual-level behaviors. Results of the 
study, however, show that reaction to the catalyst incident occurs at two levels: the group or 
societal level and the individual level. At the group or societal level the event is reported 





series of lens and filters that focus on reinterpretation of past history; where the incident 
occurred and what special meaning this may have; and cultural conflicts. This level of 
discussion occurs at a broad societal level with an emphasis on the role of the individual as 
part of the group.  Collectively these factors generate the emergence of popular nationalism. 
At the individual level, the influence of reference groups, personal safety concerns and social 
pressure encourages individual to support ideas that have emerged at the group level as 
popular nationalism. This is vividly reflected in Jason’s (23) account “I am generally okay for 
travelling to Japan. But once this incident happened, we could hear tons of news talking 
about this, which were framed in a nationalist tone. Then my friends around talked about it 
and some of them stopped buying Japanese products and going to Japanese restaurants. Some 
said it would be risky to travel to Japan because of the anti-Japan sentiments. Well, you know 
Chinese society is quite collective. So… I mean it is hard not to follow.” 
The middle section of the model illustrates the short term and long term impacts of 
Chinese popular nationalism. As the perceived severity of the incident increases, two types of 
travel constraints based on popular nationalism emerge: a grassroots travel constraint and a 
state level travel constraint. Each type of constraint has impacts based on the strength of 
“symbolic values” associated with the catalyst incident such as past history. In most cases, 
popular nationalism is initiated at the grassroots level (e.g. delaying personal travel plans) 
and as the severity of the incident accelerates, it starts to push through to the state level (e.g. 
China’s state owned enterprises). Where the state elects to accommodate popular nationalism 
(e.g., messages of discouragement from government agencies) government action is able to 
further strengthen the collective power of the grassroots response through state travel 
constraints. This is reflected in Tony’s account (41) “I think the severity of the incident does 
not depend on the reality but more than how important it looks like for us. Also, if you 





now, things changed, the grassroots people like us are more powerful and I do think the 
government is listening to us.” These points are also observed in the study of Gries, Steiger, 
and Wang (2015). 
As a consequence, these travel constraints reinforce tourists’ negative attitudes toward 
Japan and hence, their late consideration (evoked) set of destination choice is altered based 
on the severity of the incident and their attitudes and behaviors. Hence tourist destination 
selection decisions are therefore taken in compliance to personal beliefs and social norms. 
Such actions then manifest through economic counterattack (the right side of the model). In 
China, abandoning travel plans is a common response to issues related to popular 
nationalism. 
An analysis of Chinese outbound travel data indicates that although Chinese enjoy 
travelling to Japan in part because of proximity and favorable currency as well as other pull 
motivational factors (Tan, 2015), they continue to have mixed feelings and attitudes towards 
Japan. For example, “I have to say I really wanted to go to Japan, because it is close by and 
cheaper to travel there now. Also, I love shopping and the culture in Japan. But you know, 
this incident made me feel really bad. I mean [I am] just not sure why Japanese government 
are not working towards a peaceful relationship between these two countries” (Jennifer, 26).  
This and similar quotes from other respondents demonstrates how feelings of nationalism 
may be more important in destination selection than personal beliefs during a time of political 
tension.   
The data in this study shows that although these apparent impacts occurred within a 
short-term period, the long-term impacts were also implicitly generated at both grassroots 





policies towards Japan). The combined effects of such elements make the popular 
nationalism phenomenon particularly disruptive and reactive for Chinese outbound tourism. 
Discussion  
This research has demonstrated the potential for Chinese tourists to be explicitly and 
negatively influenced by Chinese popular nationalism in their attitudes and travel intentions 
towards countries that have been hostile in the past, Japan for example. Although this travel 
constraint has identified only recently in a tourism setting, it is very likely that it may have 
occurred in various forms towards other nations. The impact of Chinese popular nationalism 
fuelled by a political incident, like the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island incident, is sporadic and 
appears to have only a short-term impact. However, it may also be disruptive and lead to 
counter measures by foreign governments as well as companies that suffer economic loss 
through travel cancellations. Beyond this short impact, the long-term effects of Chinese 





incidents that generate ‘a self-feeding cycle of anti-foreign sentiments’ where the Chinese 
public look for other avenues to express views. 
Given the collective nature of Chinese society, an observation based on Hofstede’s 
(2001) pioneering work about the nature of societies, it is not surprising that in China the 
needs of the nation rather than of the individual are seen as paramount, particularly when 
there is a perception that the nation’s interests are threatened.  For this reason, when the 
nation’s interest is at stake, Chinese have a propensity to unify and collectively refrain from 
or even boycott travel to countries that are involved in a dispute with China. Given that 
Chinese culture ranks high in conflict avoidance it is also not surprising that Chinese tourists 
are likely to avoid directly confronting issues and controversies of this type and in the case of 
Japan decide not to travel there as a way of avoiding conflicts at a personal level as well as 
conforming to the social norm.  
Because of Chinese popular nationalism’s collective grassroots power, it has emerged 
as a challenging force that can shape the geopolitical environment of Chinese outbound 
tourism in contemporary China.  For this reason, tourism destinations in a bilateral 
relationship with China should be aware of the possible disruptive nature of political 
incidents particularly those that can be used by Chinese nationalists to stoke nationalist fury 
towards the destination. The model suggested in Figure 1 illustrates the processes involved 
and the type of outcomes that may be expected. 
Conclusion 
When first published, Crawford and Godbey’s (1987) model on the three dimensions of 
leisure constraints had a significant impact on the understanding of factors that constrain 





previously poorly understood class of political travel constraint that in the Chinese context 
differs from Western centric views on how citizens react to political conflicts. The paper also 
responds to a call by Dong and Chick (2012) for future empirical research that goes beyond 
the Western paradigm in constraint literature. While the intent of this study is not to 
categories Chinese popular nationalism into the existing three hierarchical travel constraint 
model, it does suggest that there is another layer of complexity that needs to be recognized 
when the travel constraint model is applied to assess relations between previous hostile 
countries such as Japan and China. More importantly, it is the first attempt to model the 
processes and factors associated with political travel constraints through popular nationalism. 
From this perspective, this highlights the need to incorporate cross-cultural factors into the 
travel constraint literature. It also highlights the need for researchers, and practitioners, to be 
alert to the potential adverse impacts of political disputes on bilateral tourist flows.   
From a border theoretical perspective, this study extends the literature on 
anti-consumption and political consumerism by investigating the effect of a social 
phenomenon on travel rather than on brands and products. Hence, it goes beyond the current 
understanding about brand and product rejection and boycott (Lee et al., 2009; Yuksel & 
Mryteza, 2009) by suggesting that these theories can be extended to a tourism context. In this 
way the study bridges a research gap by developing new understanding on the tourist decision 
making process. Travel becomes a means and an agenda for political negotiations. Based on 
the findings reported above, such a process involves impacts from both the state (and 
societal) level and the grassroots (individual) level with both long and short term adverse 
effects and consequences. More importantly, this study enriches the existing understanding of 
political consumerism in that tourists decisions on avoiding travelling to a specific destination 
goes beyond the consideration of the factors identified by Micheletti and Stolle (2006, p. 2) 





and ethical or political assessment of favorable and unfavorable business and government 
practice’. The findings also show that travel related political consumerism in China has far 
greater socio-cultural influences and implications than previously recognized. Not only did 
the central and municipal governments play a role in reinforcing the avoidance attitude and 
behaviors, the community, organizations, and the family may also play a role.  
Further, this research highlights the interdependent nature of popular nationalism and 
state nationalism in the Chinese context. As demonstrated in the model, the increasing 
pressure of popular nationalism has some potential to push the Chinese government to 
toughen its foreign policy to maintain its legitimacy (Gries et al., 2015). This in turn 
strengthens the power of Chinese popular nationalism. These observations challenge the 
current debate on international relations (IR) bargaining theory, which argues that Chinas 
international policy is based on strategic interests rather than the views that have emerged 
through popular nationalism (Weiss, 2013). To the best knowledge of the researchers, this 
research is the first attempt in the tourism literature to highlight the dual relationship between 
state and popular nationalism that co-shapes China’ foreign policy (e.g. travel policy) as well 
as the grassroots response of Chinese citizens that is expressed through cancellation of trips. 
Moreover, the study is an illustration of Putmans (1988) “two-level games”. In this study, we 
find that Chinese nationalism may be better conceptualized as a flow shifting from the 
grassroots level to state level and vice versa. Flows of this nature, which have inputs from 
these two sources, co-shape the geo-political environment at both policy and grassroots level. 
This research suggests that policy makers and tourism practitioners in countries that 
enjoy a bilateral travel relationship with China need to be aware of the potential impact of 
popular nationalism in both the short and long terms. During the island dispute period, it is 
important for Japan tourism service providers to keep a low profile instead of actively 





service providers targeting at Chinese tourists, they need exhibit additional caution in 
designing and executing their destination marketing campaigns, as any improper marketing 
campaign would potentially trigger popular nationalism reactions against their tourism 
products (Li, 2009). For Chinese tourism service providers, they should also exert caution 
whether they should blindly follow the trend against traveling to Japan by showing support, 
as a nationalist goal is not necessarily shared (Li, 2009), particularly some respondents in this 
study explicitly expressed that they regarded these companies to manipulate public 
sentiments to increase their commercial value rather than offer genuine support. Additionally, 
a large number of the respondents’ their travel intention towards Japan changed after this 
island dispute, which indicates the popularity of Japan as a tourist destination. At the same 
time, they also expressed their future concerns. As pointed by one of the reviewers, it is 
important to understand this mixed feeling of Chinese tourists, with both hatred and love, 
towards Japan and how destinations could better help Chinese tourists negotiate their political 
travel constraints to facilitate their love relationship with the destination. Additionally, such 
frameworks could be used to understand tourist flow between China and Vietnam or the 
Philippines to reflect the emergent identities of Chinese popular nationalism in the process of 
the transition happening in China today.   
While this research focused on Chinese/Japanese bilateral flows, similar problems in 
bilateral relations exist between other nations that have experienced political dispute, such as 
Korean and Japan. In the case of Japan and Korea, nationalism can be identified as one of the 
underlying factors in the emergence of disputes that lead to a fall in tourist flows (Kim & 
Prideaux, 2012). As such, future research taking political context of the selected countries 
beyond China into consideration could expand the proposed research framework by exploring 
its manifestations in other tourism destinations. Additionally, further longitudinal research is 





elements of the framework. As such, our research has presented a small step in this larger 
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